

# TO REVITALISE OR REPLANT? – CRAIG TUCKER

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*For everything there is a season, and a time for every matter under heaven: a time to be born, and a time to die; a time to plant, and a time to pluck up what is planted; (Eccl 4:1-2)*

## Introduction

Church planting is often spoken of in terms that suggest it is the silver bullet for gospel growth.<sup>1</sup> Starting a church from scratch is seen as the sexy and most strategic model for urban renewal. Is this necessarily so? Could the revitalisation of existing churches sometimes be a better option, and if so, when is it better to revitalise rather than plant?

This paper briefly outlines four different church plant/revitalisations in Sydney's Inner West that took place in 2001-2016. These works had a number of things in common: English speaking ministry, minimal outside funding, Presbyterian, all in the same Presbytery, initiated by the Presbytery or churches within the Presbytery rather than head office, making use of the property of an existing ministry that had waned or failed, and appointing planters with similar theological training and very similar theological and ecclesiological convictions. However, each of the four planter/renewers chose distinctly different models.

This exploration of four case studies, while small in sample, offers an opportunity to compare four different approaches, in contexts which shared many common factors. All four planter/renewers responded to a questionnaire that in most cases was followed up by further detailed questions.<sup>2</sup> The study concludes by demonstrating how these four Australian examples confirm and illustrate the findings of American researchers regarding when to revitalise and when to start over. The study suggests that urban renewal strategies should consider a range of models and treat each renewal opportunity individually. The results illustrate that planting and renewal can take nuanced forms. The study suggests that in adopting a particular model both the strengths of the renewer/planter and the particular characteristics of the incumbent congregation were principal factors in adopting a particular approach.

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<sup>1</sup> For example, Keller acknowledges this as a common objection against church planting - *Center Church*, 360.

<sup>2</sup> See *Appendix 1: Questionnaire* page 9 for the list of questions to which extensive written responses were provided.

Location	Model	Commencement of New Work
Rozelle	New Plant	2015
Strathfield	Replant	2012
Drummoyne	Parallel Plant	2001
Balmain	Revitalisation	2011

## Urban Renewal in the Inner West

While each of these four locations had individual characteristics that set them apart from the others, one common factor was that the Inner West of Sydney was undergoing significant gentrification. An elderly, Anglo-Saxon and working class dominant demographic was giving way to a younger, tertiary educated and multicultural demographic.<sup>3</sup> All four locations were transitioning from predominantly low density housing to areas of high density housing.<sup>4</sup>

## Snapshots

### Rozelle – New Plant

The Rozelle church was initially established in the 1890s but closed in the 1970s. The 200 seat capacity building was then rented to the council as a community centre for 40 years. A minister's residence remained part of the assets of the church. The church building is strategically placed in a main street location. After 40 years of vacancy the denomination moved to sell the buildings and place the assets into general revenue. The Presbytery initially acquiesced but later opposed this decision. A student with 12 months study still to complete was appointed as the church planter in late 2013. Together with some central denominational funding, three churches within the Presbytery formally sponsored the church plant financially, committing funds for three years. The community centre lease was renegotiated so that for the first three years of the plant the church had use of the facilities on Sundays and mid-week evenings, while still receiving rental income from the community centre which operated during business hours Monday to Friday.

While the new plant was relatively well resourced financially, it initially struggled with a lack of numbers in the launch team. The three sponsor churches were willing to give members to the launch team and allowed the planter to visit and recruit from within these congregations. However, only one

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<sup>3</sup> This is true but a generalisation. There are significant variations in demographics between the four sites which will be noted in due course. All areas in the case study, already populated by a high proportion of tertiary educated residents compared to the national average, saw an increase of 10% in this demographic between 2001 and 2011 at a time when the national percentage grew by only 5.9%. See tables and charts in *Appendix 2: Community Profiles*, page 10.

<sup>4</sup> See table: *Increase in High Density Housing*, page 10.

person from the three sponsoring churches decided to join the launch team. Through persistent networking, the planter eventually recruited a team of 14 adults. The gathering of the launch team took 12 months, delaying initial plans for the launch by 6 months. According to the planter, one advantage was that this team, coming together from various churches but united theologically, brought creativity to the plans for the church. The church commenced in Feb 2015 and has steadily grown.

## **Strathfield - Replant**

In the 20 year period leading up to the closure of the Strathfield church in 2013, the Strathfield area underwent dramatic demographic change. A significant influx of Chinese and Korean young families<sup>5</sup> changed the character of the suburb but not the church. At the time of closure, the church consisted almost exclusively of Anglo-Saxon empty nesters and retirees. There was a general acknowledgement within the small congregation of less than 30 adults that they had lost touch with the area they were trying to reach. The congregation persisted in maintaining the structures of a larger church, which had served it well in the past, and continued to strongly participate in wider denominational programs in a way that exacerbated the burn-out of its remaining members.

After several revitalisation proposals were considered, a plan was put to the congregation that they voluntarily disband in order to allow a neighbouring Presbyterian church to sponsor a new work in the building.<sup>6</sup> Existing members would join other churches in the area as each person saw fit. After a break of at least 6 months with no ministry in the building, a new church would commence with a launch team from the sponsor church. It was not envisaged that any of the existing congregation members would necessarily join the launch team.<sup>7</sup> The 6 month closure was designed to give a clear break between the two ministries. The sponsor church was a growing and vital Presbyterian church planted 10 years earlier. The mother church predominately consisted of people of Asian heritage, a significant number of whom already lived in Strathfield.

The Strathfield plant was well resourced, both in terms of property (albeit a building they quickly outgrew), as well as money and people from the sponsor church. The launch team of 30 adults and 20 children was led by the pastor of the sponsoring church. After 9 months the church building was full on Sundays (70 adults and 50 children). The vision of the plant was to closely duplicate the ministry philosophy and style of the sponsor church and for the Strathfield replant to remain substantially under the oversight of the sponsor church.

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<sup>5</sup> See table: *Ancestry and Education*, page 11.

<sup>6</sup> The vision for a new church was put by both the Interim Moderator and the planter who was one of the existing pastors at the sponsor church.

<sup>7</sup> In reality some members did return. They were invited to join the launch team but were not privileged as those belonging to the existing church.

## **Drummoyne – Parallel Plant**

Over a period of 40 years the church at Drummoyne declined from 400 to 14 adults. In 2000, the congregation was insolvent and had accumulated significant debts. The area had transformed from an Anglo-Saxon and working class dominant demographic, to a more tertiary educated and multicultural demographic. The denomination resolved to close the congregation and sell the property. However, a last minute counter-proposal by the prospective planter to continue the existing congregation and start a new congregation at a different time slot was approved by the Presbytery and the decision to sell was reversed. As distinct from a merger, where two congregations join together with a united vision to share a building, the property was given to the new church plant. However, the planter decided to maintain the existing congregation for missional reasons. The key demographic of this existing congregation (mostly over 70, working class and Anglo-Saxon) was a slowly declining but still significant group in the area, and was a group not being reached by other churches.

The vision of the new church plant was to see the existing church as a ministry by which it cared for a demographic in the local area who increasingly felt marginalised. It was anticipated that this existing congregation would close within 5 years as natural attrition took its toll. However, this older existing congregation actually grew in numbers to over 40, including significant conversion growth, and continued to maintain those numbers even though only by 2015 only one person from the 2000 congregation was still part of the church.

Rather than bring a launch team from his previous church in another part of Sydney which would not necessarily reflect the urban and professional aspects of the target demographic, the planter chose to “parachute in” and, by networking and evangelism, gather a launch team. This gathering phase took 6 months (July 2000-Feb 2001) and the new congregation commenced with a launch team of 20. The attendance on the first Sunday, including children, was 50. In 2006, in addition to the old congregation, the new plant had 120 adults attending and started a separate congregation in the evening. In 2014 there were 250 regular adults in these two new congregations.

Drummoyne was very well resourced in terms of property (a church building on a prominent cross-road location and two ministry residences), but poorly resourced in terms of personnel and finances. It had minimal cash flow and significant debts. It did not have a sponsor church. The planter worked bi-vocationally (50% planting, 50% outside employment) for the first 4 years until debts were repaid. The existing congregation was financially a net-loss ministry, as the time required from the part-time planter exceeded its proportional financial contribution.

## **Balmain - Revitalisation**

The Balmain church had significant property but in 2012 had declined to the point where, on the retirement of its minister, it was no longer financially viable (typical attendance 15 adults, average age

over 80). While options to close and replant were discussed, the Presbytery chose to approve the appointment of a minister who brought with him a modest team<sup>8</sup> from his existing church in another part of Sydney (Parramatta). This team brought new energy and leadership in ways that were crucial to a work of revitalisation.

The Inner West trends of rising tertiary education, increased high density accommodation and greater ethnic diversity are far less pronounced in Balmain when compared to the other case studies in this survey.<sup>9</sup> Unlike the other three sites, the old demographic (working class, 65+, Anglo Saxon) is still a significant minority group in the area. Like Drummoyne, the Balmain community places a high cultural value on being a multi-generational and inclusive community. This revitalisation ministry has been slow but highly successful in retaining the existing members. In comparing revitalisation to other models, the incoming pastor at Balmain notes, “[*the revitalisation model is s*]lower as you are trying to move the existing group with you. NB we have not lost a single person from the existing group ... and the vast majority are thrilled with how church is going”. Three years after the minister arrived in 2012 typical attendance was 45-50 adults and 10-12 children.

## Reflections

### Factors in choosing a model

So, is it better to revitalise or replant? When is radical change rather than gentle renewal the best strategy? The survey responses from the planters/renewers highlight some key factors they identified in addressing these questions. Three significant variables impacted the decision making process in each case: (a) the character of the existing congregation, (b) local community values, and (c) the skills/personality of the leader.<sup>10</sup>

#### **a) *The character of the existing congregation.***

For the survey respondents, the state of the existing congregation was the most important factor in determining whether a revitalisation or plant was the best option.

In the questionnaire responses, setting aside Rozelle where there was no incumbent congregation, three common characteristics of the existing congregations emerged as significant in the decision to either plant or renew - ENERGY, MORALE & DEMOGRAPHICS.

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<sup>8</sup> 6 adults initially, 4 more in the following year.

<sup>9</sup> Compared to the other three locations, Balmain had higher numbers of non-English speaking Europeans and lower numbers of residents with Asian heritage. Balmain had a higher number of “empty nesters” compared to the other areas in this survey. While in 2001 the level of tertiary educated residents on the Balmain Peninsula (41.0%) was significantly higher than Drummoyne (27.6%) or Strathfield (22.8%) and dramatically higher than the Australian average (12.9%), it grew even higher in the period between 2001 and 2011 (51.2%).

<sup>10</sup> These factors were less relevant in the Rozelle work, as the plant commenced long after the existing congregation had disbanded. There was no option but to plant at Rozelle.

These three characteristics are most clearly in contrast when Strathfield is compared with Balmain:

The **Strathfield** congregation was

- (i) ENERGY: burned out from keeping things going,
- (ii) MORALE: somewhat demoralised and divided, and
- (iii) DEMOGRAPHICS: demographically completely out of step with the area.<sup>11</sup>

In **Balmain**, the congregation was

- (i) ENERGY: still energetic enough to function well,
- (ii) MORALE: relatively united and open to renewal, and
- (iii) DEMOGRAPHICS: existing group still represented a significant demographic in the area.

In **Drummoyne**, the existing congregation sat between Strathfield and Balmain on all these three indicators (ENERGY, MORALE & DEMOGRAPHICS). Consequently, an approach that retained the existing congregation and planted in parallel was adopted.

At Drummoyne, Strathfield and Balmain, the planter/renewer, in each case spelt out to the existing congregation the changes a revitalisation would require, stylistically, culturally and theologically, prior to a decision being made regarding the viability of various approaches.<sup>12</sup> The response of the existing congregations was significant. The Balmain congregation was relatively open to the kind of changes envisaged by the incoming minister. However, when renewal options (like those embraced at Balmain) were discussed at Drummoyne and Strathfield, it became clear in both cases that the existing congregations were weary and not emotionally open to the proposed changes in style and ministry philosophy. Hence, a parallel plant was pursued in Drummoyne and a complete close down in Strathfield. At both Drummoyne and Strathfield a straightforward revitalisation was not considered by the planter to be a viable option because of the state of the existing congregation. Both Drummoyne and Strathfield existing congregations were quick to blame their decline upon the unreceptiveness to the gospel of the new demographic in their area. The existing congregations at Strathfield and Drummoyne vociferously doubted that any strategy would succeed in reaching the newcomers.

#### ***b) The cultural values of the community***

As already noted, the Drummoyne community, and even more so the Balmain community, placed a high value upon the inclusion of different demographic groups. In both cases this influenced the approach taken by the planter. In the case of Balmain, the existing group being open to the vision of a

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<sup>11</sup> While the disconnect between the demographic characteristics of the existing congregation and the local area was highlighted by all the planters/renewers, it should be noted that the only pastor in the study of Asian heritage is the Rozelle planter who is of Vietnamese background. The other three leaders are of European heritage. The Rozelle planter successfully planted a church in the area with the smallest population of Asian heritage in the sample. See table *Ancestry and Education*, page 11. In fact, Rozelle has a smaller percentage of residents of Asian heritage than the national average.

<sup>12</sup> The exact polity of the decision making process varied in each of the case studies and is not relevant to this analysis. In each case the preferred model of the planter/renewer was the model that eventuated.

revitalised inter-generational congregation and the willingness of a team representing the missing age range in the church, strongly suggested to the incoming leader that revitalisation was the best option.

**c) *The personal preference of the planter***

In the case of Strathfield and Balmain, the option deployed was also strongly determined by the personal preference of the incoming minister. Arguably, both strategies (renewal or replant) could have worked at either location if the incoming leader had enthusiasm for that model. Both pastors had previous personal experiences of church revitalisations and plants. These experiences strongly informed their preferences. For example, the planter at Strathfield, when asked, “Would other models have worked?” replied in part, “Probably but I am really glad that we have employed the one we have.” The incoming pastor at Balmain answered the same question, “I think we [minister and his wife] were open to the ‘parallel plant’ model [Drummoyne model] if the other [revitalise] didn’t work.” These answers indicate that both pastors were open to other options and believed that other options may have worked, but their answers also indicate a strong preference. In each case, in follow up interviews the leader in question acknowledged that their personality was drawn to a particular model. Both pastors suggested that their personal gifting drew them to the particular model they adopted. For example, the incoming pastor at Balmain identified “patience and an ability to work with different age groups” as essential skills/giftings required to make the revitalisation model work. In each case, this preference enabled the incoming leader to provide a clear and enthusiastic vision with which they personally resonated. The survey answers suggest that where more than one strategy appears to be viable at a particular site (renewal, parallel plant, or replant) the gifting and preference of the incoming planter/renewer should be the factor that determines which strategy is adopted.

**d) *Other Factors***

In passing, our four examples do not provide enough data from which to draw strong conclusions but they do reinforce some other findings in church planting/renewal research:

- (i) Smaller core groups produce smaller churches; larger core groups produce larger churches.<sup>13</sup>
- (ii) Visionary leadership is crucial.<sup>14</sup>
- (iii) The effectiveness of deploying experienced church planters in planting, replanting and revitalisation contexts.<sup>15</sup>

**e) *Non-determinative characteristics***

Two factors, common to each of the locations, do not appear to have determined whether to renew or plant:

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<sup>13</sup> “Failure to Launch” in Griffith and Easum, *Ten Most Common Mistakes Made by Church Starts*, 33–44.

<sup>14</sup> Stetzer and Dodson, *Comeback Churches*, 15.

<sup>15</sup> Stetzer and Dodson, *Comeback Churches*, 16.



- (i) In each of these case studies a piece of property was an important resource in the church plant/renewal. However, that different models were pursued suggests that the availability of property does not automatically steer the renewer/planter toward a particular approach.<sup>16</sup>
- (ii) The availability (or lack of availability) of a launch team had an impact upon the progress of work in each case but did not lead to an automatic preference for a plant over a revitalisation. At both Strathfield and Balmain a team came with the leader, but one planted while the other renewed. Both of these leaders reported the ability to import a quality team as a significant factor in the growth of the work. At Balmain the planter believed that bringing a team was a crucial factor in being able to effectively revitalise the congregation. At Strathfield, the ability to start with a substantial team was a crucial factor in tipping the incoming minister in favour of a plant. At Rozelle and Drummoyne a decision was made to plant before a team existed and without it being immediately obvious where such a team might come from.

### **Confusing Viability for Vitality**

In three of the four cases in the survey, the reluctance of the denomination to intervene earlier in declining congregations was a major factor in limiting options. Due to inaction, until precipitated by a financial or personnel crisis, some revitalisation strategies ceased to be possibilities. The decision to plant or over-plant was necessary because the incumbent congregation had deteriorated to the point where revitalisation was no longer a realistic option. The three declining congregations in this survey had all created the illusion of vitality by their ability to maintain their financial viability. It is observed more widely, across denominations, that declining multi-congregation and/or multi-staff churches with several ministry properties are gradually consolidated over decades into one small gathering that manages to employ a single pastor by renting out surplus properties that were once effectively utilised in ministry. In each case study in this survey, rental income created an illusion of vitality and masked the serious decline in attendance and giving. These congregations had long since ceased to grow by evangelism. Psychologically, all the energy in the declining congregations was invested in dogged survival of their current format for the sake of the existing members.<sup>17</sup> The “other” demographic

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<sup>16</sup> All the respondents were mindful of the pros and cons in using existing property. In outer suburb locations, churches can build buildings with disabled access and facilities for families, without the encumbrance of heritage restrictions. However, all four locations inherited heritage-listed buildings. All the planter/renewers noted that the properties were inflexible, not friendly to the disabled or to families, and required significant upkeep. This has particularly become the case at Strathfield and Drummoyne which have reached capacity in at least one time slot and face difficulties in reconfiguring buildings with heritage restrictions. Nevertheless, the advantages of *inheriting* property should not be overlooked. Young urbanites looking for roots and community may find a traditional looking building a significant positive. In the Inner West of Sydney at the time of these new works (2001-2014) suitable facilities were extremely difficult to rent and the purchase of a church building was out of the reach of all four projects.

<sup>17</sup> Bullard has identified the way dying congregations focus all their energy of maintaining structures not newcomer growth, “The Life Cycle and Stages of Congregational Development,” 18–20.



moving into the area and displacing the incumbent demographic of the church were regarded as a problem not an opportunity. Failure to attract the new demographic was blamed on the new demographic. By the time the financial crisis arrives, forcing these congregations to face change, they are completely out of step demographically with the area around them and often exhausted from just keeping things running. Stetzer and Dodson concur, “Many churches never experience a comeback because they want the community to change while they remain the same”.<sup>18</sup>

### **Links to the Research - a willingness and ability to be missional**

Drawing on American church data, Stetzer and Dodson argue that the crucial factor in deciding if a church can be revived is whether the church is willing to change its inward mindset and replace it with an outward, missional mindset.<sup>19</sup> A missional church “gives focus to meeting the needs inside and outside the church. It takes care of its own, but it also reaches out for the sake of the gospel”.<sup>20</sup> For the existing members this is a change that will usually feel like more focus on the outsider than the insider, because for so long the balance has been the other way. The church must be willing to make costly change to its own stylistic preferences and current culture, in order to reach those outside the church. The church must begin believing in the power of the gospel and reject the narrative that suggests new demographic groups around them are absent from church because these groups are inordinately unreceptive to the gospel.<sup>21</sup> The strong reticence to reject this narrative was a key factor in determining the strategy adopted at Strathfield and Drummoyne. Conversely, a willingness to reject this narrative was a key factor in determining the strategy adopted at Balmain.

Stetzer and Dodd argue that “comeback” churches that start (again) to reach their community must first undergo a radical internal gospel renewal. This requires leadership that draws people together, to pray, read the Scriptures, apply the gospel bravely to their own hearts and lives, and take baby steps in genuine evangelism. According to Stetzer and Dodd, these are the signs of a church where revitalisation, humanly speaking, appears the best option. “One of the most important conclusions we’ve drawn from our study of comeback churches is that they first had a spiritual experience that

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<sup>18</sup> *Comeback Churches*, 16. Note that Stetzer and Dodson highlight the way churches revitalize without any significant injection of new personnel beyond the pastor. None of the models in this survey exactly fit this profile.

<sup>19</sup> The term *missional* is used in many different ways. It is used here to define a mindset that is concerned for the lost as much as it is concerned with the wellbeing of its existing members – see Stetzer and Dodson, *Comeback Churches*, 4. This is different to the disjunction made by Hirsch and Frost who have popularised a dichotomy between *missional* and *attractional* - *The Shaping of Things to Come*; see the helpful discussion by Stetzer and Dodson, *Comeback Churches*, 4–5, 220.

<sup>20</sup> Stetzer and Dodson, *Comeback Churches*, 5.

<sup>21</sup> Speaking in the context of existing churches being challenged by new churches reaching groups that existing churches regarded as unreachable, Keller contends: “Often older congregations are too timid to try a particular approach, convinced it ‘could never work here.’ But when the new church in town succeeds with a new approach, other churches take notice and muster the courage to try it themselves.[...] Often the growth experienced in a new congregation brings about humility and repentance for defeatist and pessimistic attitudes.” - *Center Church*, 360–61.

redirected and reenergised their lives, beginning with their leader...The church changed from the inside out. And when it did the community took notice that something special was happening.”<sup>22</sup>

A willingness to be missional should not be confused with a willingness to accept stylistic change. It is not a debate about whether “contemporary” worship is better than “traditional” worship.<sup>23</sup> It is a matter of the heart. In our study, all four churches adopted different styles of gatherings but were effective in bringing gospel growth and renewal. For example, the existing church at Drummoyne and the renewed church at Balmain both saw growth in numbers using a very traditional style of gathering. Both were churches that transformed from declining inward looking congregations to those genuinely concerned to reach the lost around them. Both saw renewed efforts in evangelism to those outside the church and conversions from within the ranks of the long standing attendees. In both cases, the choice to persevere with a traditional format, albeit with some small changes to accommodate families, was made for missional reasons. Significantly, this was a conscious strategy to reach the outsider rather than a style designed to keep the existing members comfortable.<sup>24</sup> At Drummoyne the new morning congregation and new evening congregation had distinctly different styles but both grew. Finding the “right style” is not the key. The crucial thing is not modernisation but missionisation.

## Conclusion

When to revitalise and when to replant? These four case studies of Presbyterian churches in the Inner West of Sydney highlight that there ought not to be a one size fits all approach to urban renewal strategies. A variety of approaches should be considered. In the four cases examined, while there were some local differences, locations with some significantly similar characteristics flourished even though different strategies were adopted. With regard to the local differences, some factors appear to be more important than others. In the cases studied, the state of the incumbent congregation and the cultural value in the local community of inclusion emerged as key determinants. Other factors, such as the availability, or lack of, an incoming team, were not determinative in the choice to either revitalise or plant. Notably, in the survey responses, the skills/personality of the planter/renewer emerged as an important determinant. That the skills/preference of the incoming planter/renewer are a significant factor suggests that a model should not be chosen for a location before a particular planter/renewer is appointed. Both the characteristics of the location and the characteristics of the planter/renewer should be weighed in the decision to revitalise or replant.

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<sup>22</sup> Stetzer and Dodson, *Comeback Churches*, 15–16. See also Keller, *Center Church*, 77–83.

<sup>23</sup> “God’s kingdom is not best represented by franchises of McChurch. If you focus your energies on copying someone else’s methodologies or programs, you will miss something crucially important...” Slaughter, *UnLearning Church*, 15. See also Stetzer and Putman, *Breaking the Missional Code*, 16–28.

<sup>24</sup> This should not be confused with the proposition that a particular style of church gathering is inherently more missional than any other. While it may well be a sign of an *un-missional heart* when church members refuse to accept contemporary stylistic change, even though they know it will best serve the unreached around them, evidence abounds of churches where the members insist upon a contemporary style simply because it is the style they prefer. This preference is often dressed up (deceptively) in the rhetoric of being more missional.

This brief survey provides a corrective to thinking that regards green field church planting as the automatically best or sexiest option. Church planting is not the only tool in the kit for urban renewal. These four case studies illustrate the value of carefully considering a variety of nuanced approaches in weighing up whether to plant or revitalise.

#### About the author

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## Appendix 1: Questionnaire

Each planter/renewer responded with expansive answers to the following questions.

Describe the model deployed in your own words.

What support, connections does this work have to other churches, the denomination, etc?

Where have new people come from?

Why (in your view) did the previous ministry fail?

How is the new church different to the old church?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of your particular model?

Would other models have worked?

What made this model the best strategy for this situation?

What would be the essential factors that would need to be in place in a particular context before you would recommend this model?

What strength/skills does the pastor particularly need to make this model work?

How were you recruited/self-selected for this work? Describe the process of deciding to be the pastor for this work.


What strengths/skills did you need to learn/acquire for this ministry that you did not already have from previous ministry experience?

## Appendix 2: Community Profiles

ABS data, accessed via the portal at <http://profile.id.com.au/> (Accessed 21 Sept 2016)

*In the figures that follow the statistically similar demographic profiles of Rozelle and Balmain are reflected, for simplicity, by the Balmain Peninsula statistical area. The exception is the first graph (below) where the significantly different housing density characteristic of the areas immediately around the church buildings of Balmain and Rozelle are provided.*

### Increase in High Density Housing





Percentage of residents living in high density housing.

## Ancestry and Education


	Strathfield	Drummoyne	Balmain Pen.	Australia
Ancestry (English + Australian) 2011	19.3	54.9	69.5	66.7
Ancestry (Chinese + Korean) 2011	28.7	5.9	3.2	4.4
Bachelor Degree or Higher 2011	32.8	37.9	51.2	18.8
Bachelor Degree or Higher 2001	22.8	27.6	41.0	12.9
Bachelor Degree or Higher Change over 10 years	10.0	10.3	10.2	5.9

*All figures are percentages.*




## Age Profile


2011 census, age distribution comparing the 4 areas in this survey with the overall Australian distribution :



Strathfield:




Drummoyne:



Balmain Peninsula:





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